OBJECTIONS · LIBER·II · NO·CXLVI
Is Stoicism just emotional suppression in a toga?
The most common criticism is also the most useful one. It is worth taking seriously before answering it.
Funerary relief fragment, Roman, second century. Getty Villa.
The objection is worth stating at full strength before anyone answers it. A philosophy that treats grief, fear and desire as errors of judgement, and that promises you can reason your way out of them, looks a great deal like a permission slip to stop feeling things and call it wisdom.
That is not a strawman. It is roughly what a lot of contemporary Stoicism sells, and the ancient texts are not blameless: Seneca’s consolations do tell a bereaved mother that reason should have finished her mourning by now.
Say to yourself at daybreak: I shall come across the meddling, the ungrateful, the arrogant.
Where it lands
It lands hardest on the popular version, which is mostly a productivity ethic wearing a toga. Read that way, the discipline of desire becomes a technique for wanting less so you can be disappointed less, which is not equanimity. It is anaesthesia.
Where it misses
What it misses is that the Stoics distinguish the first involuntary shock, which they grant is unavoidable, from the judgement layered on top. Marcus does not claim not to be angry. He claims the anger is his own work, and that noticing this is the beginning of doing something else.
Whether that distinction survives real grief is the open question. Our position is that it survives about half of it, and that the half it does not survive is the part worth reading Seneca for.
Priya Raghunathan
Writes the objections series. Trained as a philosopher, argues for a living, reads Seneca against her better judgement.
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